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ABSTRACT
The recent European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and other data protection regulations restrict the processing of
some categories of personal data (health, political orientation, sex-
ual preferences, religious beliefs, ethnic origin, etc.) due to the
privacy risks associated to such information. The GDPR refers to
these categories as sensitive personal data. This paper quantifies
the portion of Facebook (FB) users, across 197 countries, who are
labeled with advertising interests linked to potentially sensitive
personal data. Our study reveals that Facebook labels 67% of users
with potential sensitive interests. This corresponds to 22% of the
population in the referred 197 countries. Moreover, our work shows
that the GDPR enforcement had a negligible impact in this context
since the portion of FB users labeled with sensitive interests in the
European Union remains almost the same 5 months before and 9
months after the GDPR was enacted. The paper also illustrates po-
tential risks associated to the use of sensitive interests. For instance,
we quantify the portion of FB users labelled with the interest "Ho-
mosexuality" in countries where being gay may be punished with
the death penalty. The last contribution is the implementation of a
web browser extension that allows FB users removing in a simple
way the potentially sensitive interests FB has assigned them.
1 INTRODUCTION
Worldwide citizens have demonstrated serious concerns regarding
the management of personal information by online services. For
instance, the 2015 Eurobarometer about data protection [12] reveals
that: 63% of EU citizens do not trust online businesses, more than
half do not like providing personal information in return for free
services, and 53% do not like that Internet companies use their per-
sonal information in tailored advertising. Similarly, a recent survey
carried out among US users [9] reveals that 53% of respondents
were against receiving tailored ads from the information websites
and apps learn about them, 42% do not think websites care about
using users data in a secure and responsible way at all, and 73% con-
siders web sites know too much about users. A survey conducted
by Internet Society (ISOC) in the Asia-Pacific region in 2016 [8]
disclosed that 59% of the respondent did not feel their privacy is
sufficiently protected when using the Internet and 45% considered
urgent to get the attention of policymakers in their country on data
protection matters.
Policymakers have reacted to this situation by passing or propos-
ing new regulations in the area of privacy and/or data protection.
For instance, in May 2018 the EU enforced the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) [6] across all 28 member states. Similarly,
in June 2018 California passed the California Consumer Privacy
Act [10], claimed to be the nation’s toughest data privacy law. In
countries like Argentina or Chile governments proposed in 2017
new bills updating their existing data protection regulation [13].
For the purpose of this paper we will take as reference the GDPR
since it is the one affecting more countries, citizens and companies.
The GDPR (but also most data protection regulations) defines
some categories of personal data as sensitive and prohibits process-
ing them with limited exceptions (e.g., the user provides explicit
consent to process that sensitive data for a specific purpose). In par-
ticular, the GDPR defines as sensitive personal data: “data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data,
bio-metric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s
sex life or sexual orientation”.
Due to the legal, ethical and privacy implications of processing
sensitive personal data, it is important to verify whether online
services may be commercially exploiting such sensitive information.
If that is the case, it is also essential to measure the portion of
users/citizens who may be affected by the exploitation of their
sensitive personal data. In this paper, we address these crucial
questions focusing on online advertising, which represents the most
important source of revenue for most online services. In particular,
we consider the case of Facebook (FB), whose online advertising
platform is second only to Google in terms of revenue [5].
FB labels users with the so-called ad preferences, which represent
potential interests of users. FB assigns users different ad preferences
based on their online activitywithin this social network. Advertisers
running ad campaigns can target groups of users that have been
assigned a particular ad preference (e.g., target FB users interested in
“Starbucks” ). Some of these ad preferences suggest political opinions,
sexual orientation, personal health, and other potentially sensitive
attributes. In fact, an author of this paper received the ad shown in
Figure 1 (left side). The text in the ad clearly reflects that the ad was
Figure 1: Snapshot of an ad received by one of the authors
of this paper & ad preference list showing that FB inferred
this person was interested in Homosexuality.
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targeting homosexual people. The author had not explicitly defined
his sexual orientation, but he discovered that FB had assigned him
the “Homosexuality” ad preference (see Figure 1 right side). The
dataset collected for this research suggests that similar assignment
of potentially sensitive ad preferences occurs much more broadly.
For example, some landing pages associated with ads stored in
our dataset include: iboesterreich.at (political), gaydominante.com
(sexuality), elpartoestuyo.com (health).
This episode illustrates that FB may be actually processing sen-
sitive personal information, which is now prohibited under the EU
GDPR without explicit consent, but it was neither allowed under
some EU national data protection regulations prior to the GDPR.
In May 2017, the French Data Protection Agency (DPA) fined Face-
book with e150K arguing (among other things) that FB "collects
sensitive data of the users without obtaining their explicit consent".1
Similarly, In September 2017, the Spanish DPA fined FB e1.2M
arguing (among other things) that FB “collects, stores and uses data,
including specially protected data, for advertising purposes without
obtaining consent”. 2
Motivated by all these events, this paper examines Facebook’s
use of potentially sensitive data across 197 different countries in
February 2019. The main goal of this paper is quantifying the por-
tion of FB users that may have been assigned ad preferences linked to
potentially sensitive personal data. In addition, for the particular case
of the 28 countries forming the EU, we analyze whether there has
been some relevant reduction in the portion of users labelled with
potentially sensitive ad preferences comparing three datasets col-
lected in January 2018, October 2018 and February 2019 (5 months
before, 5 months after and 9 months after the GDPR was enacted,
respectively). We also illustrate privacy and ethics risks that may be
derived from the exploitation of sensitive FB ad preferences. Finally,
we present a technical solution that allows users to remove in a
simple way the potentially sensitive interests FB has assigned them.
2 BACKGROUND
Advertisers configure their ads campaigns through the FB Ads Man-
ager.3 It allows advertisers to define the audience (i.e., user profile)
they want to target with their advertising campaigns. It can be ac-
cessed through either a dashboard or an API. The FB Ads Manager
offers advertisers a wide range of configuration parameters such
as (but not limited to): location (country, region, etc.), demographic
parameters (gender, age, etc.), behaviors (mobile device, OS and/or
web browser used, etc.), and interests (sports, food, etc.). The interest
parameter is the most relevant for our work. It includes hundreds
of thousands of possibilities capturing users’ interest of any type.
The FB Ads Manager provides detailed information about the con-
figured audience. The most relevant element for our paper is the
Potential Reach that reports the number of monthly active users in
FB matching the defined audience.
In parallel, FB assigns to each user a set of ad preferences, i.e., a
set of interests, derived from the data and activity of the user on FB.
These ad preferences are indeed the interests offered to advertisers
1https://www.cnil.fr/en/facebook-sanctioned-several-breaches-french-data-
protection-act
2https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/11/facebook-fined-e1-2m-for-privacy-violations-
in-spain/
3https://www.facebook.com/ads/manager
in the FB Ads Manager.4 Therefore, if a user is assigned “Watches”
within her list of ad preferences, she will be a potential target of
any FB advertising campaign configured to reach users interested
in watches.
The dataset used in this work is obtained from the data collected
with our FDVT web browser extension [1]. The FDVT main func-
tionality is to inform FB users of the revenue they generate out of
the ads they receive in FB. The FDVT collects (among other data)
the ad preferences FB assigns to the user. It is important to note
that FDVT users granted us explicit permission to use the collected
information (in an anonymous manner) for research purposes.
Finally, for any ad preference, we are able to query the FB Ads
Manager API to retrieve the Potential Reach (i.e., FB active users)
associated to any FB audience. Hence, we are able to obtain the
number of FB users in any country (or group of countries) that have
been assigned a particular interest (or group of interests).
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We seek to quantify the number of FB users that have been assigned
potentially sensitive ad preferences across 197 countries in February
2019. To this end we follow a two step process.
First, we identify likely sensitive ad preferences within five of the
relevant categories listed as Sensitive Personal Data by the GDPR:
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, health, and sexual orientation. This paper reuses the list
of 2092 potentially sensitive ad preferences we obtained in [2] out
of analyzing more than 126K unique ad preferences assigned 5.5M
times to more than 4.5K FDVT users.
To extract that list we first implemented an automatic process
to reduce the list of 126K ad preferences to 4452 likely sensitive ad
preferences. Next, a group of 12 panelists manually classified the
4452 ad preferences into sensitive, in case they could be assigned
to some of the five sensitive categories referred above, or non-
sensitive. Each ad preference received 5 votes, and we used majority
voting [11] to classify each ad preference either as sensitive or non-
sensitive. Overall, 2092 out of the 4452 ad preferences were labeled
as sensitive. The complete list of the ad preferences classified as
sensitive can be accessed via the FDVT site 5. We referred to this
subset of 2092 ad preferences as the suspected sensitive subset. We
collected this set in January 2018, and checked that 2067 out of
these 2092 potentially sensitive ad preferences were still available
within the FB Ads Manager in February 2019.
Second, we leveraged the FB Ads Manager API to retrieve the
portion of FB users in each country that had been assigned at least
one of the Top N (with N ranging between 1 and 2067) potentially
sensitive ad preferences from the suspected sensitive subset. In
particular, we retrieve how many users in a given country are
interested in ad preference 1 OR ad preference 2 OR ad preference
3... OR ad preference N. An example of this for N = 3 could be “how
many people in France are interested in Pregnancy OR Homosexuality
OR Veganism”. We have defined the following metric that we use
in the rest of the paper
4Given that interests and ad preferences refer to the same thing, we use these two
terms interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
5https://fdvt.org/usenix2018/panelists.html
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Figure 2: Choropleth map of the number of FB users assigned potentially sensitive ad preferences (FFB(C,1000)) for the 197
countries analyzed in the paper.
-FFB(C,N): Percentage of FB users in country C that have been
assigned at least one of the top N potentially sensitive ad prefer-
ences from the suspected sensitive subset. We note C may also
refer to all the countries forming a particular region (e.g, EU, Asia-
Pacific, America, etc.). FFB(C,N) is computed as the ratio between
the number of FB users that have been assigned at least one of the
top N potentially sensitive ad preferences and the total number of
FB users in country C. Finally, it is important to note that the FB
Ads Manager API only allows creating audiences with at most N =
1000 interests. Therefore, in practice, the maximum value of N we
can use to compute FFB is 1000.
4 EXPOSURE OF FB USERS TO POTENTIALLY
SENSITIVE AD PREFERENCES
We have computed the portion of FB users that have been assigned
some of the 2067 potentially sensitive ad preferences within 197
different countries. Figure 2 shows a choropleth map of FFB(C,1000)
for those countries in February 2019.
If we consider the 197 all together, 67% of FB users are tagged
with some potentially sensitive ad preference. This portion of users
actually corresponds to 22% of citizens across the 197 analyzed coun-
tries according to the population data reported by the World Bank6.
However, FFB shows an important variation across countries.
We find that the most impacted country is Malta where 82%
of FB users are assigned some potentially sensitive ad preference.
Contrary, the least impacted country is Equatorial Guinea where
37% of FB users are assigned potentially sensitive ad preferences.
More interesting, an overview of the map seems to suggest that
western countries have a higher exposure to potentially sensitive ad
preferences compared to Asian and African countries. To quantify
these effects we have computed the Pearson correlation of the FFB
metric with the following socio-economic indicators: (i) FB pene-
tration, (ii) expected years of school; (iii) access to a mobile phone
6https://data.worldbank.org
indicator correlation FFB p_value
FB penetration 0.544 2.2e-16
Expected Years of School 0.444 7.249e-09
Access to a mobile phone or
internet at home (% age 15+) 0.395 1.478e-06
GDP per capita (current USD) 0.381 5.733e-08
Voice and Accountability 0.372 1.142e-07
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) -0.455 4.922e-11
Table 1: Pearson correlation and p_value between FFB and
six socioeconomic development indicators of the country.
or internet at home; (iv) GDP per capita; (v) voice and account-
ability;and (vi) birth rate. Note that Western developed countries
shows higher values in all the indicators but birth rate. Hence our
hypothesis is that we will find positive correlation between FFB
and all the indicators but birth rate. Table 1 shows the results of
the referred correlations. Note that in all the cases the results are
statistically significant since the highest p-value is 1.478e-06.
The results Table 1 corroborate our hypothesis since all the indi-
cators but birth rate are positively correlated with FFB. In summary,
the results validate our initial observation that FB users in western
developed countries are more exposed to be labelled with sensi-
tive ad preferences than users in Africa and Asia. It is interesting
to observe that in the case of South-America we observe a similar
pattern in which the most powerful economies and developed coun-
tries such as Brazil, Chile and Argentina shows higher exposure to
sensitive ad preferences than other countries in South-America.
5 EXPOSURE OF FB USERS TO VERY
SENSITIVE AD PREFERENCES
Although legislation tries to define what sensitive data is, some
people might think that not all different sensitive data items are
equally sensitive. For instance, data revealing sexual orientation
from somebody could be considered more sensitive than, for exam-
ple, data showing that one user may be affected by a flu. Therefore,
3
ad preference Africa America Asia Europe Oceania World
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 3.40 11.35 3.27 7.17 10.82 6.26
BIBLE 13.28 14.65 6.31 8.13 14.61 9.68
BUDDHISM 2.87 5.38 10.36 4.13 7.19 7.23
FEMINISM 3.22 9.27 2.08 6.52 10.84 5.01
GENDER IDENTITY 0.08 0.46 0.07 0.20 0.60 0.21
HOMOSEXUALITY 2.66 7.93 2.27 6.07 8.48 4.57
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 0.26 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08
JUDAISM 11.06 3.72 1.91 2.24 2.44 3.33
LGBT COMMUNITY 3.93 13.89 5.39 11.94 14.82 8.79
NATIONALISM 1.82 1.11 1.28 1.32 0.95 1.28
ONCOLOGY 1.30 1.33 0.38 0.84 0.97 0.81
PREGNANCY 11.75 19.17 11.58 17.09 21.41 14.71
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 0.36 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.19
SUICIDE PREVENTION 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.08 1.02 0.13
VEGANISM 5.97 14.18 6.83 16.98 22.78 10.61
UNION 30.43 40.66 27.62 38.25 46.92 33.45
Table 2: Percentage of FB users (FFB) withinAfrica, America,
Asia, Europe and Oceania assigned some sensitive ad pref-
erences from a list of 15 expert-verified sensitive ad prefer-
ences as non-GDPR compliant. Last column "World" shows
FFB for the aggregation of all 197 considered countries. Last
row shows the result for the 15 ad preferences aggregated.
the level of sensitivity of our list of interests could vary depending
on the importance given by someone.
In this section, we zoom in our analysis in a narrowed list of
interests that match undoubtedly with the definition of the GDPR
for the case of sensitive personal data. We examined a subset of
15 ad preferences that have been verified by an expert from the
Spanish DPA as initially not compliant with the GDPR definition
of sensitive personal data.
We retrieve the portion of users in FB for each of the 15 expert-
verified ad preferences and the aggregation of them. Since it is
unfeasible to show the results for each of the countries within the
paper, we have grouped them into five continents: Africa, America,
Asia, Europe and Oceania. To obtain the desegregated results for
each of the 197 countries we refer the reader to the following
external link.7
Table 2 shows FFB for each of the expert-verified sensitive ad
preferences within the five continents. In addition, the last row
referred to as Union shows the aggregated results considering all
the 15 interests within a group, while the last columnWorld depicts
the overall results considering all 197 countries. The results shows
that when considering all the 197 countries 33% of FB users, which
corresponds to almost 11% of citizens within those countries, have
been labeled with some of the 15 sensitive interests in the table.
As it was expected from the correlation results depicted in the
previous section, Asia and Africa are showing the lowest values of
FFB (27.62% and 30.43%, respectively). The exposition of FB users
grows up to 38.25% , 40.66% and 46.92% for Europe, America and
Oceania, respectively.
If we look in detail some of the ad preferences in the table, we ob-
serve that the portion of users across the 197 countries labeled with
the ad preference homosexuality is almost 5%. This number dou-
bles for the ad preference bible (intimate related to one particular
religious belief), and grows up to almost 15% for pregnancy.
7https://fdvt.org/world_sensitivities_2019/display_sensitivities.html
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Figure 3: Variation of FFB in percentage points for each EU
country between: (i) the data obtained in January 2018 and
October 2018 (5months before and 5months after the GDPR
was enacted) represented by the grey bar; (ii) the data ob-
tained in January 2018 and February 2019 (5 months before
and 9 months after the GDPR was enacted) represented by
the black bar. The last label (EU28) represents the results for
all EU countries together.
6 COMPARISON OF EU FB USERS EXPOSURE
TO POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE AD
PREFERENCES BEFORE AND AFTER GDPR
ENFORCEMENT
This section aims to analyze whether the GDPR enforcement had
some effect on the utilization of potentially sensitive ad preferences
to label FB users in the EU. To that end we compare the exposure of
EU users to potentially sensitive ad preferences in January 2018 [2]
(5 months before the GDPRwas enforced) to the exposure measured
in October 2018 and February 2019 (5 and 9 months after the GDPR
was enforced, respectively).
The first relevant change is that Facebook had removed 19 ad
preferences in October 2018 and 25 in February 2019 from the set
of 2092 potentially sensitive ad preferences we retrieved in January
2018. Although this is a negligible amount, it is worth noting that
five of the removed ad preferences are: Communism, Islam, Quran,
Socialism and Christianity. These five ad preferences were included
in an initial set of 20 ad preferences verified by the DPA expert as
very sensitive. Hence, it seems FB is starting to consider some very
sensitive interests as too invasive and has decided to remove them
from its advertising platform.
Figure 3 shows the FFB difference in percentage points between
the results obtained in January 2018 and October 2018 (grey bar);
and between January 2018 and February 2019 (black bar) across the
28 EU countries, and the EU aggregated labeled as EU28.
If we consider the results of October 2018, we observe that the
portion of users labelled with potentially sensitive ad preferences
was lower in all EU countries but Spain after the GDPR enforcement
(i.e., compared to the data obtained in January 2018). However, the
aggregated EU reduction is rather small, only 3 percentage points.
The largest reduction is 7.33 percentage points in the case of Finland.
4
code country homosexuality code country homosexuality
AF AFGHANISTAN 12.31 BN BRUNEI 5.24
MR MAURITANIA 0.99 NG NIGERIA 2.35
QA QATAR 2.35 SA SAUDI ARABIA 2.08
SO SOMALIA 1.44 YE YEMEN 1.08
PK PAKISTAN 1.54 IQ IRAQ 3.20
AE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3.00
Table 3: Percentage of FBusers (FFB) taggedwith the interest
Homosexuality in countries where being homosexual may
lead to death penalty. Notewe do not include Iran and Sudan
since FB is not providing information for those countries.
The slight GDPR effect observed in the results obtained in Oc-
tober 2018 seems to disappear when we observe the results from
February 2019. There are 13 countries where the portion of users
labelled with potentially sensitive data is higher in February 2019
as compared to January 2018. Overall, the aggregated results shows
that the portion of users labeled with potentially sensitive ad pref-
erences in February 2019 is only 1% less than in January 2018.
In summary, FB seems to have adopted some steps to eliminate
few very invasive ad preferences, but the overall impact of the
GPDR to prevent FB of using potentially sensitive ad preferences
for advertising purposes is negligible.
7 ETHICS AND PRIVACY RISKS ASSOCIATED
WITH SENSITIVE PERSONAL DATA
EXPLOITATION
The possibility of reaching users labeled with potentially sensi-
tive personal data enables the use of FB ads campaigns to attack
(e.g., hate speech) specific groups of people based on sensitive per-
sonal data (ethnicity, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, etc.). Even
worse, in [2], we performed a ball-park estimation showing that in
average an attacker could retrieve personal identifiable information
(PII) of users tagged with some sensitive ad preference through a
phishing-like attack [7] at a cheap cost ranging between e0.015
and e1.5 per user, depending on the success ratio of the attack.
Following, we describe other potential risks associated to sensitive
ad preferences.
Recently, a journalist of the Washington Post wrote an article
to denounce her own experience after she become pregnant.8 It
seems FB algorithms inferred that situation out of some actions
she performed while browsing in Facebook. Probably FB labelled
her with the ad preference "pregnancy" or some other similar and
she started to receive pregnancy-related ads. Unfortunately, the
journalist had a stillbirth but she kept receiving ads related to
pregnancy, which exposed here to a very uncomfortable experience.
Another serious risk, which in our opinion is extremelyworrying,
is linked to the fact that many FB users are tagged with the interest
"Homosexuality" in countries where being homosexual is illegal and
may even be punished with the death penalty. There are still 78
countries in the world where the homosexuality is penalized9 and
few of them such where Death Penalty is the maximum punishment.
Table 3 shows the FFB metric results only considering the interest
"Homosexuality" in countries that penalize homosexuality with the
death penalty. For instance, in the case of Saudi Arabia we found
8https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2018/12/12/dear-tech-companies-i-
dont-want-see-pregnancy-ads-after-my-child-was-stillborn/
9https://ilga.org/downloads/2017/ILGA_WorldMap_ENGLISH_Criminalisation_
2017.pdf
Figure 4: Snapshot of FDVT new feature to allow users delet-
ing sensitive ad preferences.
that FB assigns the ad preference "Homosexuality" to 540K people
(2.08% of FB users in that country). In the case of Nigeria 620K
(2.35% of FB users in that country).
We acknowledge the debate regarding what is sensitive and
what is not is a complex one. However, we believe FB should take
immediate actions to avoid worrying and painful situations like
the one exposed in this section, in which FB may unintentionally
expose users to serious risks. For instance, a straightforward action
should be stop using the ad preference "Homosexuality" (or similar
ones) in countries where being homosexual is illegal.
8 FDVT EXTENSION TO ALLOW USERS
REMOVING POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE AD
PREFERENCES
The results reported in previous sections motivate a need for solu-
tions that make users aware of the use of sensitive personal data for
advertising purposes. In addition, it is also important to empower
them to remove in a very simple manner those sensitive ad prefer-
ences they do not fill comfortable with. Unfortunately, the existing
process FB offers is unknown and complex for most users.To this
end, we have extended the FDVT browser extension to: (i) inform
users about the potentially sensitive ad preferences that FB has
assigned them, both the active ones but also those ones assigned
in the past that are not currently active; (ii) allow users to remove
with a single click either all the active sensitive ad preferences or
those individual ones users do not fill comfortable with.
We have introduced a new button in the FDVT extension inter-
face with the label ”Sensitive FB Preferences”. When a user clicks on
that button, we display a page listing at the top the potentially sensi-
tive ad preferences included in the user’s ad preference set (both the
active ones and inactive ones). Figure 4 shows an example of this
page. We provide the following information for each ad preference:
(i) Ad preference name, (ii) Topic and, (iii) Sensitive, whether the
ad preference is potentially sensitive (highlighted in yellow) or not.
In addition, next to each ad preference there is a button Delete Ad
Preference to individually remove those ad preferences. Moreover,
5
we provide another button More Info to individually display the
historical information for the ad preference, which includes the pe-
riod(s) when the ad preference has been active and the reason why
FB has assigned that ad preference to the user. Finally, at the top of
the page we include a search bar to look for specific preferences
and two buttons: Delete All Sensitive Ad Preferences and Delete All
Ad Preferences to remove all currently active potentially sensitive
ad preferences and all currently active, respectively.
9 RELATEDWORK
We published a prior paper [2] in which we already analyzed the
use of sensitive information on Facebook. That paper just focuses
on the European Union few months before the GDPR was enacted.
The research community asked us in various forums that it would
be interesting to further extend our analysis to: (i) cover the use of
sensitive information in Facebook worldwide and not just in the
EU, and (ii) understand the potential impact that the GDPR could
have on reducing the exposure of users to sensitive ad preferences.
This paper covers both requests and, in addition, it adds two more
contributions: (i) we present two clear scenarios in which the use
of sensitive ad preferences could have serious consequences for
the users; and (ii) we introduce an improvement of the FDVT that
allows users to remove in a simple way potentially sensitive ad
preferences they do not like. Hence, this paper notably extends our
previous work.
There are also few previous works in the literature that address
issues associated with sensitive personal data in online advertising,
as well as some recent works that analyze privacy and discrimina-
tion issues related to FB advertising and ad preferences.
Carrascosa et al. [3] propose a new methodology to quantify
the portion of targeted ads received by Internet users while they
browse the web. They create bots, referred to as personas, with
very specific interest profiles (e.g., persona interested in cars) and
measure how many of the received ads actually match the specific
interest of the analyzed persona. They create personas based on
sensitive personal data (e.g., health) and demonstrate that they are
also targeted with ads related to the sensitive information used to
create the persona’s profile.
Castellucia et al. [4] show that an attacker that gets access (e.g.,
through a public WiFi network) to the Google ads received by a
user could create an interest profile that could reveal up to 58% of
the actual interests of the user. The authors state that if some of
the unveiled interests are sensitive, it could imply serious privacy
risks for users.
Venkatadri et al. [15] and Speicher et al. [14] exposed privacy
and discrimination vulnerabilities related to FB advertising. In [15],
the authors demonstrate how an attacker can use Facebook third-
party tracking JavaScript to retrieve personal data (e.g., mobile
phone numbers) associated with users visiting the attacker’s web-
site. Moreover, in [14] they demonstrate that sensitive FB ad prefer-
ences can be used to apply negative discrimination in advertising
campaigns (e.g., excluding people based on their race). The authors
also show that some ad preferences that initially may not seem
sensitive could be actually used to discriminate in advertising cam-
paigns (e.g., excluding people interested in Blacknews.com that are
potentially black people).
10 CONCLUSION
Facebook offers advertisers the option to commercially exploit po-
tentially sensitive information to perform tailored ad campaigns.
This practice lays, in the best case, within a gray legal area accord-
ing to the recently enforced GDPR. Our results reveal that 67% of
FB users (22% of citizens) worldwide are labeled with some poten-
tially sensitive ad preference. Interestingly, users in rich developed
countries present a significantly higher exposure to be assigned
sensitive ad preferences. Our work also reveals that the enforce-
ment of the GDPR had a negligible impact on FB regarding the use
of sensitive ad preferences within the EU. We believe it is urgent
that stakeholders within the online advertising ecosystem (i.e., ad-
vertisers, ad networks, publishers, policy makers, etc.) define an
unambiguous list of personal data items that should not be used
anymore to protect users from potential privacy risks as those ones
described in this paper.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was partially funded by: (i) the Ministerio de Economía,
Industria y Competitividad, Spain, and the European Social Fund
(EU), under the Ramón y Cajal programme (grant RyC-2015-17732),
and the Project TEXEO (Grant TEC2016-80339-R), (ii) the European
H2020 Project SMOOTH (Grant 786741), (iii) the Ministerio de
Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Spain, through the FPU programme
(Grant FPU16/05852), and (iv) the Community of Madrid synergic
project EMPATIA-CM (Grant Y2018/TCS-5046).
REFERENCES
[1] José González Cabañas, Ángel Cuevas, and Rubén Cuevas. 2017. FDVT: Data
Valuation Tool for Facebook Users. In Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
3799–3809. https://doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025903
[2] José González Cabañas, Ángel Cuevas, and Rubén Cuevas. 2018. Unveiling and
Quantifying Facebook Exploitation of Sensitive Personal Data for Advertising
Purposes. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). USENIX
Association, Baltimore, MD, 479–495. https://www.usenix.org/conference/
usenixsecurity18/presentation/cabanas
[3] Juan Miguel Carrascosa, Jakub Mikians, Ruben Cuevas, Vijay Erramilli, and Niko-
laos Laoutaris. 2015. I Always Feel Like Somebody’s Watching Me: Measuring
Online Behavioural Advertising. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on
Emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies (CoNEXT ’15). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, Article 13, 13 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2716281.2836098
[4] Claude Castelluccia, Mohamed-Ali Kaafar, and Minh-Dung Tran. 2012. Betrayed
by your ads!. In International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Symposium. Springer, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1–17.
[5] Emarketer.com. 2017. Google and Facebook tighten grip on us digital ad mar-
ket. https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Google-Facebook-Tighten-Grip-on-
US-Digital-Ad-Market/1016494.
[6] EU. 27 April 2016. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). http:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj.
[7] Jason Hong. 2012. The State of Phishing Attacks. Commun. ACM 55, 1 (Jan. 2012),
74–81. https://doi.org/10.1145/2063176.2063197
[8] InternetSociety.org. 2016. The Internet Society Survey on Policy Issues in Asia-
Pacific 2016. https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
APAC_Regional_Policy_Survey_Report_2016_final_copy.compressed.pdf.
[9] Janrain.com. 2018. Consumer Attitudes Toward Data Privacy Survey
2018. https://www.janrain.com/resources/industry-research/consumer-
attitudes-toward-data-privacy-survey-2018.
[10] California State Legislature. 2018. California Consumer Privacy Act. https:
//www.caprivacy.org/.
[11] Anand Narasimhamurthy. 2005. Theoretical bounds of majority voting perfor-
mance for a binary classification problem. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis
and Machine Intelligence 27, 12 (2005), 1988–1995.
6
[12] TNS Opinion and Social. 2015. Special Eurobarometer 431 Data Protection. http:
//ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf.
[13] PWC.in. 2018. Privacy in the Data Economy. https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/
publications/2018/privacy-in-the-data-economy.pdf.
[14] Till Speicher, Muhammad Ali, Giridhari Venkatadri, Filipe Nunes Ribeiro, George
Arvanitakis, Fabrício Benevenuto, Krishna P Gummadi, Patrick Loiseau, and Alan
Mislove. 2018. Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted Advertising. In
Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency
(Proceedings of Machine Learning Research), Sorelle A. Friedler and ChristoWilson
(Eds.), Vol. 81. PMLR, New York, NY, USA, 5–19.
[15] Giridhari Venkatadri, Yabing Liu, Athanasios Andreou, Oana Goga, Patrick
Loiseau, Alan Mislove, and Krishna P Gummadi. 2018. Privacy risks with Face-
book’s PII-based targeting: Auditing a data broker’s advertising interface. In S&P
2018, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, San Francisco, CA, USA,
89–107.
7
